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Department of Defense and Homeland Security analysts are
increasingly using multi-agent simulation (MAS) to exam-
ine national security issues. This paper summarizes three
MAS national security studies conducted at the Naval Post-
graduate School. The first example explores equipment and
employment options for protecting critical infrastructure.
The second case considers non-lethal weapons within the
spectrum of force-protection options in a martitime environ-
ment. The final application investigates emergency (police,
fire, and medical) responses to an urban terrorist attack.
There are many potentially influential factors and many
sources of uncertainty associated with each of these sim-
ulated scenarios. Thus, efficient experimental designs and
computing clusters are used to enable us to explore many
thousands of computational experiments, while simultane-
ously varying many factors. The results illustrate how MAS
experiments can provide valuable insights into defense and
homeland security operations.
1 INTRODUCTION
For many decades, Department of Defense (DoD) and other
national defense analysts have studied potential large-scale
warfare between states. The results of these analyses often
inform decisions on how nations should build, organize,
maintain, and, if necessary, employ their military and secu-
rity forces. Since there is a dearth of such conflicts, most of
this analysis has been and is being done via experimentation.
Because of the expense and other constraints associated with
live experimentation, much of this experimentation is done
with simulation.1381-4244-1306-0/07/$25.00 ©2007 IEEEThe simulations that have traditionally been used to
examine large-scale, force-on-force conflicts are typically
very large and are often tightly structured. The simulation
size follows from the sheer number of entities involved
and the extent of the conflicts being simulated. The struc-
ture follows from the forces’ hierarchical organizations and
carefully planned doctrine. Moreover, simulating human
decision making is notoriously difficult, and is often done
with humans in-the-loop or using subject matter experts to
specify (or “script”) behaviors.
Recent events have forced a change in emphasis of the
situations that DoD and the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) study. Today’s adversaries typically operate in
small, decentralized, adaptive cells. The individual battles
themselves usually involve relatively few combatants and
are of short duration. These situations lend themselves to
being examined with multi-agent simulation (MAS). Com-
putational experiments using MAS allow insight into the
relationships among various agents and their potential strate-
gies and actions (Lucas and Sanchez 2002; Sanchez and
Lucas 2002; Cioppa, Lucas, and Sanchez 2004). This
paper extends earlier work, but shifts the application em-
phasis from force effectiveness to counter terror operations
and employs more complicated (and bigger) experimental
designs.
In its basic form, a MAS contains agents (i.e., software
objects) that interact with each other and their perceived
virtual environment. The hallmark of these models is the
degree of autonomy of the individual agents. That is, the
agents have a set of desires (e.g., stay alive, complete the
mission, obey orders, move away from danger, etc.) and they
take actions in an attempt to simultaneously satisfy multiple
objectives. Interesting and unexpected macro behavior often
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Another attractive feature of many of the MAS being
used in defense and homeland security analysis is that they
are relatively easy to construct and run quickly—at least in
comparison to traditional DoD simulations. This, and their
inherent flexible nature (i.e., the agents adapt to changing
conditions), allows them to be used to quickly explore a
wide range of possibilities. This is particularly useful in
fluid situations involving a large number of uncertainties—as
with many homeland security issues.
Most of the simulation models used in defense and
homeland security analysis have a large number of po-
tential input variables. Furthermore, the situations being
modeled make it difficult to estimate the veracity of the
models (Hodges and Dewar 1992). Such models are often
best used for exploratory analysis. The exploratory analysis
approach helps people think through complicated issues by
illuminating the consequences of various assumptions; rein-
forcing or challenging intuition; illustrating alternatives that
might not have been considered; and generating questions
that otherwise would have been overlooked. In short, the
primary goal of exploratory analysis is to gain a better under-
standing of the system or process by identifying significant
factors and interactions, as well as finding regions, ranges,
and thresholds where interesting things happen (Lucas et
al. 2002; Kleijnen et al. 2005). This contrasts sharply with
the traditional uses of simulations—predicting, optimizing,
or tuning—as articulated by Sacks et al. (1989).
Section 2 contains an overview of the tools and tech-
niques for performing large-scale simulation experiments
at the Naval Postgraduate School. This is followed by
summaries of three recent thesis projects by SEED Center
graduate students. Section 3 describes a study that examines
the defense of thousands of simulated attacks on off-shore
oil facilities. Section 4 reviews an analysis of how non-lethal
weapons can be used to provide additional protection to ships
in a crowded maritime environment. The last example, Sec-
tion 5, examines the emergency response to a coordinated
terrorist attack (consisting of a bomb and snipers) during
a festival within a major urban area. Our conclusions and
research directions are contained in Section 6.
2 EXPLORING MULTI-AGENT SIMULATIONS IN
THE SEED CENTER FOR DATA FARMING
The MAS applications discussed in this paper are a few of
those being used to explore national security issues by the
SEED Center for Data Farming at the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS). SEED is an acronym for Simulation Exper-
iments and Efficient Design, while data farming refers to
using high-performance computation to grow data.
The SEED Center for Data Farming was established to
advance the collaborative development and use of simulation139experiments and efficient designs to provide decision makers
with timely insights on complex systems and operations.
The harvested data can then be analyzed using data mining
and other statistical techniques. To achieve its goals, the
SEED Center is building an environment that facilitates
quickly building models; running them efficiently a large
number of times over many input combinations; analyzing
the output; subjecting the results to subject matter expert
review; and iterating this process. The environment consists
of several components:
• A family of tools for quickly constructing (mostly
multi-agent) simulations. The examples in the
paper use two such tools: (i) Map Aware Non-
Uniform Automata (MANA), developed by New
Zealand’s Defence Technology Agency (Galligan,
Anderson, and Lauren 2004); and (ii) PYTHAGO-
RAS, developed by the Northrop Grumman Corpo-
ration (Bitinas, Henscheid, and Middleton 2006).
• A portfolio of experimental designs for use in
model exploration. Simulation experimenters have
a breadth of different needs, depending on the
number of factors they wish to explore, the ob-
jectives of that exploration, the meta-models they
desire to be able to fit, the run time required, and
more. The SEED Center is continually expand-
ing and improving on the collection of designs
available for high-dimensional exploration, such
as sequential screening (Sanchez, Wan and Lucas
2005, 2007), very large fractional factorial and
central composite designs (Sanchez and Sanchez
2005), and specially constructed nearly orthogo-
nal and space-filling Latin hypercubes (Cioppa and
Lucas 2007).
• Computing clusters, which enable parallel execu-
tion of multiple computational experiments.
• Statistical analysis and visualization packages for
gleaning insights from the output data.
While these components are necessary for our explo-
rations, they are insufficient. Another key research direction
of the SEED Center is the software that links these capabili-
ties together to create an environment that allows modelers,
analysts, and subject matter experts to quickly construct
and analyze models. The end result is a quick, broad,
exploratory analysis capability.
The SEED Center for Data Farming has completed
over 50 studies while building this environment. Many
of these studies are student theses—most of which are
applications of the ideas to investigate a breadth of military
and homeland security issues. The next three sections
summarize three such examples. The SEED Center’s web
pages at <harvest.nps.edu> contain links to graduate
Lucas, Sanchez, Martinez, Sickinger, and Roginskitheses and other publications, spreadsheets and software for
constructing experimental designs, and additional resources.
3 MARITIME PROTECTION OF CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE ASSETS
The Campeche Sound is an area of great economic impor-
tance to Mexico, and is the source of more than 83 percent
of the petroleum produced in Mexico. Its strategic value
and economic worth make these facilities one of Mexico’s
greatest assets. Much of that oil is sold to the United States,
which makes these facilities a potential target for terrorist
groups that want to harm either Mexico or the United States.
Indeed, Al Qaeda called for attacks on countries that supply
oil to the United States—and identified Mexico by name as
a recommended target (NBC News 2007).
To protect this critical asset, Petroleos Mexicano (PE-
MEX) and the Mexican Navy maintain mutually supportive
security strategies in the Campeche Sound. During a state
of green alert (the normal posture), the force deployment
in the operational area consists of the following:
• One HURACAN-class missile ship, SAAR 4.5,
with a shipborne helicopter.
• Four POLARIS-class interceptor patrol boats.
• An E-2C HAWKEYE Airborne Early Warning
(AEW) aircraft.
• A C-212 AVIOCAR Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA).
• An intercepting aircraft, type REDIGO.
• One helicopter, type MI-17.
These craft patrol and enforce prevention and exclusion
areas that have been established. We focus our analysis on
the surface zones. In the marine prevention area, there is
a system of access control for all boats. In the exclusion
area, the authorized navigation of boats to the facilities
is allowed only after being verified by units of the Navy.
Figure 1 shows the Campeche Sound, the numerous marine
oil facilities, and the exclusion zones.
Are the existing assets and the accompanying tactics
enough to protect these facilities from a terrorist attack? If
not, what new capabilities or tactics are required? Should
the protection zones be changed? Do incursions by the
numerous fishing boats in the area create a vulnerability?
These are but a few of the many questions that those in
charge of protecting the Campeche Sound seek to answer.
Ideally, one would want to experiment in the real world
with different sets of equipment and their tactics against a
variety of threats. Unfortunately, doing so may be impos-
sible (the equipment may not yet be purchased), extremely
expensive, or impractical (as this is a busy place). However,
insights can be obtained quickly and inexpensively through140simulation experiments. What follows is a summary of such
experiments (Martinez 2005).
To examine the protection ofMexico’s Campeche Sound
marine oil facilities, a simulation was constructed using
MANA as a distillation tool. In a distillation, the scenario
abstraction strives to capture only the essence of the situation
by avoiding unessential details. The threat chosen to test
the Navy’s defenses is a simultaneous attack by up to three
high-speed boats acting as Kamikazes. This is similar to
previous maritime terrorist attacks—such as the suicide
boat attack on USS Cole. The terrorist boats are assumed
to be loaded with explosives and each targets a separate
critical platform. The threat is deemed successful if at least
one critical platform is destroyed. The Mexican Navy’s
assets are a subset of the assets listed above. A success
in stopping the terrorist boats’ attack occurs when at least
one Navy resource intercepts and kills the attacking boats
with no damage to the hydrocarbon facilities. In addition,
the situation is complicated by the presence of numerous
fishing vessels and other ships working in the area. All of
these ships must be identified and tracked. Figure 2 displays
a screen shot of the implemented scenario in MANA.
All told, this simulation consists of hundreds of agents.
Each has a set of capabilities, such as a maximum speed,
sensing and communication abilities, and weapons. Fur-
thermore, each agent has a set of desires. For example, the
terrorist boats want to get to their targets, while avoiding the
Mexican Navy’s defenses. The Navy’s assets want to iden-
tify and track all vehicles in the area. If a ship is in a zone
that it is not allowed to be in, the Navy will attempt to get it
to leave the area. If the vehicle does not respond, and it is
within the exclusion zone, the Navy will attempt to destroy
it sufficiently far from all platforms. The fishing boats and
service vessels just want to go about their business—but
may stray into areas they are suppose to avoid.
Many simulation experiments were run consisting of
various combinations of Mexican Navy assets (controllable
factors) and terrorist boat attacks (uncontrollable factors).
We now describe one such set of experiments.
The controllable factors are the different combinations
possible in the area that can be obtained by interchanging
the key elements and practices of the overall naval force,
including:
• Presence of the HAWKEYE AEW aircraft.
• Presence of the AVIOCAR MPA.
• Aerial patrol by aircraft, type REDIGO, or heli-
copter, MI-17.
• Patrol area of a HURACAN ship.
• Number of POLARIS interceptor boats in the area
(0 to 2).
A full factorial design, with some constraints, results in
60 combinations of the Navy’s assets. These factors were
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Figure 1: The Campeche Sound.
 
Figure 2: Screen shot of the MANA implementation of the Campeche Sound simulation.141
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ining all of the Navy’s assets) and numerous preliminary
trials—many of the latter taken while developing and testing
the model.
The uncontrollable factors varied in these experiments
are the number of terrorist boats (from 1 to 3), the speed
of those boats (from 20 to 45 knots), and the number of
fishing vessels entering the forbidden area during the attack
(from 0 to 5). A total of 17 combinations of these factors
were obtained by using an orthogonal Latin hypercube from
Cioppa and Lucas (2007), with rounding for the discrete
factors.
The design for the controllable factors was crossed with
the design for the uncontrollable factors. This ensures that
each combination of controllable factors is run in similar
uncontrollable (or noise) circumstances. The result is a total
of 60×17= 1,020 input combinations. Since MANA is a
stochastic simulation, 50 replications were taken at each of
these design points. This results in 51,000 simulated attacks.
These experiments were conducted over a weekend using
the Maui High-Performance Computing Center (MHPCC).
The analysis of the resultant output data used three
primary analysis techniques: Regression trees (also called
classification trees), regression analysis, and the one-way
analysis of means of each of the critical factors in the
model. Two types of analyses were done: one used all
of the factors as independent variables, while the other
allowed only the controllable factors into the models in
order to seek robust maritime protection strategies. Figure
3 shows a regression tree constructed using all of the input
variables. Here, the response is the proportion of successful
attacks by terrorists—less being better.
The important insights found analyzing the full model
are summarized in the following list:
• The most important factor in the probability of
destroying at least one platform is the speed of
the terrorist boats. Their speed limits the reaction
time of the Mexican Navy. When the speed of the
terrorist boats is slower, the terrorists can increase
their chances of success by employing more boats.
• When the HAWKEYE AEW aircraft is present in
the area, its early warning and broad surveillance
capabilities provide a significant increase in the
probability of destroying all of the terrorist boats.
• The probability of killing enemy terrorist boats
before they reach an oil platform decreases when
more than two fishing boats are in the maritime
prevention area during a terrorist boat attack. Note:
this result is gleaned from an expanded tree.
Insights on models constructed with only the control-
lable factors as independent variables include:142• Because of its long range surveillance radar for de-
tection and classification, and significant commu-
nication capability, the HAWKEYE AEW aircraft
is the most important of the controllable factors.
• When the HAWKEYE AEW aircraft is absent in
the scenario, it is important that the AVIOCAR
MPA (which serves in a very similar role as the
HAWKEYE AEW aircraft, but with less range in
its surveillance radar) be present in the area.
• The patrol area of the HURACAN ship is not
important in the model. Both main patrol areas,
the exclusion area and the maritime prevention
area, have the same effect within the model.
• The HURACAN ship is only significant in the
scenarios when it carries a shipborne helicopter.
• The additional POLARIS interceptor boats in the
area are only significant if the route of the terrorist
boats lies within their patrol area.
• The patrol areas of the REDIGO aircraft and the
MI-17 helicopter patrolling are insignificant in the
model. This does not mean that they are not
necessary in the scenarios; it means that any of
these units’ presence in the area has the same effect.
The analyses that led to these conclusions can be found in
Martinez (2005).
Once built, a simulation like this can be used to address
many other question, such as alternative threats and potential
future capabilities for the Navy to consider investing in.
These can also include sensitive issues, such as the size and
shape of the prevention and exclusion areas and the Navy’s
rules of engagement (ROE). It also suggests intelligence
requirements. For example, the above analysis suggests
that we should pay special attention to boats in the area
that travel at or above 37 knots.
4 NON-LETHAL CAPABILITIES IN A MARITIME
ENVIRONMENT
The terrorist attack on USS Cole on October 10, 2000
reenergized national efforts towards preserving freedom of
the seas and safe access to ports, with a directed focus on
force protection initiatives and technology. The tremen-
dous potential of non-lethal capabilities in maritime force
protection has been recognized by the Quadrennial Defense
Review, as well as an independent study conducted by
the Naval Studies Board. This research, sponsored by the
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, directly impacts the
current development of non-lethal requirements and tactics
needed for effective maritime security.
The following questions were identified by Sickinger
(2006) for an entering port force protection mission:
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Figure 3: Regression tree on all factors for the Campeche Sound simulation.• What non-lethal capabilities are required for a mar-
itime force protection mission?
• When are non-lethal capabilities tactically appro-
priate?
• What are the geographical effects?
• How are non-lethal capabilities used to identify
threats from nonthreats?
• Is MAS an appropriate modeling tool?
The first step in answering these questions was to
develop a scenario within a MAS environment that appro-
priately emulated a Navy ship’s ability to do three tasks:
(1) identify potential threats; (2) determine intent of ap-
proaching small vessels; and (3) deter vessels from closing
within the 100-yard naval protective zone.
Three reasons influenced the choice of PYTHAGORAS,
a Northrop Grumman product, as the MAS. First, it offers a
unique set of capabilities appropriate for this investigation.
Specifically, PYTHAGORAS:
• Incorporates soft rules to distinguish unique agents;
• Uses desires to motivate agents into moving and
shooting;
• Includes the concept of affiliation (established by
sidedness, or color value) to differentiate agents
into members of a unit, friendly agents, neutrals,
or enemies;143• Allows for behavior-changing events and actions
(called triggers) that may be invoked in response
to simulation activities; and
• Retains traditional weapons, sensors, and terrain.
Second, PYTHAGORAS is specifically designed to be com-
patible with data farming, greatly facilitating the data collec-
tion effort. Third, as a U.S. developed model, this research
can be applied to quickly assist our operating forces in ex-
ploiting vulnerabilities and determining tactics to mitigate
risk within ports and choke points throughout the world.
The scenario chosen for virtual experimentation focuses
on a U.S. Navy ship, returning to port, entering the Elizabeth
River from Thimble Shoals Channel (Figure 4). This is a
challenging scenario because of the constrained geography
that the shipmust transit. The situation is further complicated
by numerous pleasure craft, fishing vessels, and merchant
ships in the area.
The primary blue agent is the ship returning to port.
The ship is equipped with three types of non-lethal weapons:
an acoustic hailing device, an optical dazzler, and warning
munitions. Of course, the ship also contains lethal means
of keeping ships from getting too close. The goal is to use
the non-lethal weapons to minimize the ship’s vulnerability,
while simultaneously minimizing the chances of engaging
a neutral vessel with lethal weapons. The attacking (or red)
agents vary in number and in tactics. Basically, they loiter
among the civilian shipping, looking for opportunities to
get close enough to the blue ship to cause it damage.
Lucas, Sanchez, Martinez, Sickinger, and Roginski 
Figure 4: Actual terrain and the model’s terrain for the Thimble Shoals Channel.Once the scenario was developed, the next step was to
apply an efficient design of experiment (DOE) and cluster
processing in order to capture a wide region of possible
outcomes. The final scenario was simulated over a range of
33 input variables. These input factors included everything
from the number of hostile boats, to the requirements of
the non-lethal capabilities, such as range and firing rates,
to quantified intangibles, such as fear and aggression levels
of inbound targets. Most of these factors are continuous,
but a handful (like the number of threats) are integer.
Through the power of simulation, over three quarters
of a million data points were generated over multiple it-
erations. The primary design technique used was, again,
nearly orthogonal Latin hypercubes—with rounding for the
discrete factors. Several iterations were made, typically
involving tens of thousands of simulated port entries over
a few hundred input combinations involving approximately
20 variables.
The key element in tying the data to the research
questions were the measures of effectiveness selected for
analysis. These were:
• Deterrence ratio: The percentage of time the targets
are deterred.
• Hostile identification ratio: The percentage of time
targets are identified as hostile, engaged, and sub-
sequently killed, with lethal force.
• Warning zone identification ratio: Among those
targets identified as hostile, the percentage of time
identification occurs outside the threat zone using
non-lethal capabilities.144Using multiple data mining techniques, ordinary statistics,
and visualization tools, the mammoth amount of data was
efficiently analyzed to provide insight on the research ques-
tions. Key insights into non-lethal requirements and tactical
application (from Sickinger 2006) include:
• The employment of non-lethal capabilities is ex-
tremely effective when used to identify threats from
nonthreats in an ambiguous situation.
• Inbound speed is the critical factor in identifying
and engaging inbound hostile threats outside of the
exclusion zone.
• The number of inbound targets has little to no
impact on identification and engagement rates of
hostile targets.
• The first response non-lethal capability is the most
crucial in deterring nonsuicidal targets.
• The acoustic hailing device is significantly more
effective when employment time is less than 30
seconds against hostile targets and one minute for
neutral or loitering targets.
• When used alone, counterpersonnel non-lethal ca-
pabilities fail to deter loitering targets who attack
when within close proximity.
With a limited number of non-lethal capabilities applied
to a very specific mission, this thesis researched what other
possible applications are appropriate using the methodology
applied. Follow-on work was identified for three primary
research areas:
Requirements: This research modeled three counter-
personnel, non-lethal capabilities. Future work is needed
to expand scenarios to include countermaterial capabilities.
Lucas, Sanchez, Martinez, Sickinger, and RoginskiTactics: The scenario simulated involved one primary
tactic adapted from current U.S. Navy tactics. Future work
should include a comparative analysis of new tactics, espe-
cially in areas where this research deemed current tactics
fall short.
Vulnerability Assessments: In addition to exploring
the requirements and tactics of the non-lethal capabilities,
this research was very effective in exploring the geographic
vulnerabilities of the modeled port. Given this success,
applying this methodology to other geographic ports or
choke points of interest could assist in anti-terrorism and
force protection planning prior to ship arrival.
In summary, this research used cutting edge modeling
and simulation to effectively emulate a complex scenario
where little historical performance data exists. It produced
valuable insights by applying proven operations research
tools and techniques, and provides a revolutionary compli-
ment to subject matter expertise in non-lethal requirements
and tactics development early in the acquisition process.
5 EMERGENCY FIRST RESPONSE TO A CRISIS
EVENT
Large-scale disasters can quickly overwhelm the capabili-
ties of state and local governments. An effective response
in these situations results from integrating state and local
agencies with their federal counterparts, thus enabling the
flow of needed resources and knowledge. Toward this end,
a Presidential Directive was issued as part of a plan to
prepare for and mitigate the effects of crisis events. This
directive led to the establishment of the National Exercise
Program (NEP). National-level exercises, such as those that
comprise the NEP, test and evaluate federal, state, and local
integration and readiness to confront a man-made or natural
disaster.
Top Officials (TOPOFF) exercises are the foundation
of the NEP. These large-scale exercises involve participa-
tion from all levels of governmental and nongovernmental
agencies inside and outside the United States. These exer-
cises are currently being planned and executed with very
little consideration given to the value of simulation as a
preparation tool.
Simulation is a widely used decision support tool be-
cause it allows staffs and decision makers to explore given
problems in ways that are otherwise impractical (e.g., due to
resources needed) or impossible (e.g., running an exercise
with thousands of parameter permutations). The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) recognizes the value of
simulation and reviews simulation models for applicability
before each TOPOFF planning process begins. As yet, DHS
has not found the right tool for the job.
Figure 5 demonstrates an organizational learning pro-
cess adapted from a methodology developed by the U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center145Monterey (TRAC-MTRY). This methodology is an iter-
ative process that uses a quick-turnaround, low-resolution
model to provide initial insights into a given problem. Those
insights are used in the execution of a high-resolution sim-
ulation, such as a wargame. As with any high-resolution
simulation, wargaming results can be actionable results;
that is, the decision maker can use these results to finalize
the plan that was wargamed. However, the decision maker
can also decide to adjust the low-resolution simulation and
iterate the process until they obtain satisfactory results.
The process established in this research expands the
TRAC-MTRY methodology, which includes a general flow
that uses the power of simulation to train a given audi-
ence. This research shows a specific process by which
low-resolution and high-resolution simulation can be used
together to help organizations prepare for a TOPOFF exer-
cise, or any other large-scale training exercise.
High-resolution simulations, such as wargames, are
established decision support tools. TRAC-White Sands
Missile Range developed a model to facilitate the execution
of wargames in a first-response setting. The Emergency
Preparedness incident Command System (EPiCS) was used
in February 2006 to simulate emergency first response to
a bomb attack in Baltimore’s Inner Harbor area, during a
festival. To assess and demonstrate the potential of an agile,
low-resolution simulation in this methodology, a MAS was
developed in PYTHAGORAS to simulate the same vignette.
The simulation involves a small terrorist cell that detonates
a car bomb, then works to further incite panic, while a
gunman lies in wait for first responders to attack. Police,
fire, and medical personnel respond to the bomb blast area,
in which walking wounded and stretcher wounded civilians
are panicking. First responders have the following priorities
of work, in which police, emergency medical technicians,
and firefighters will:
• Stabilize wounded civilians.
• Restore calm in the area.
• Eliminate further threats.
• Maintain the safety of the first responders.
An illustrated screen shot of the emergencyfirst response
MAS appears in Figure 6. Analyzing the first responder
effectiveness involves exploring a 48-dimensional space to
gain an understanding of the complex relationships involved
in this problem. Furthermore, about half of these factors take
on integer values. For example, the number of responders of
various types in various locations (a dozen factors) is varied
from 0 to 8. This exploration required an efficient design of
experiments (DOE). A traditional factorial (gridded) design
would have resulted in experimental runs that lasted 116
trillion times the current age of the universe.
The DOEs developed for this research uses both the
flexibility of Flexible Random Latin Hypercube (FRLH)
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Figure 5: Adaptation of TRAC-MTRY’s learning methodology.sampling (Hernandez 2007), and the space-filling nature
of Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) sampling.
Using 1,008 input combinations, Hernandez was able to
generate a design matrix with a maximum absolute pair-
wise correlation of 0.001. Fifty replications were run per
input combination. Despite the use of these highly efficient
designs, 156 CPU centuries were required to complete the
experiment. This was possible only by using the supercom-
puters at the Maui High Performance Computing Center
(MHPCC). The data set analyzed contained over 50,000
rows by more than 5,000 columns.
The analysis of the data from this model (see Roginski
2006 for details) suggest the following:
• Overwhelmingly, the most important factor in
achieving success in crisis mitigation is the ef-
fectiveness of the police in taking positive control
of the crowd, exerting calming influence, and pro-
viding direction.
• If a police force is not well trained, and therefore
not very effective, the officers may achieve greater
success by being less persistent with individuals;
that is, by spreading their influence more broadly.146• Well established, well executed standing operating
procedures (SOPs) may play a more important
role in first response operations than interagency
communication.
• There may be a level of diminishing returns for
first responder training; that is, a person can be
only so trained. After that level is reached, it may
be more effective to leverage resources elsewhere.
The results of the data analysis are not meant to di-
rectly apply to actual emergency response techniques, or
specifically to the City of Baltimore. This model does not
include the actual force structure and SOPs from Baltimore,
but data adapted from the February 2006 EPiCS run. This
research is a proof of concept to show that it is possible to
quickly and credibly model emergency first response with a
MAS, and the data analysis from such a credible, verified,
and calibrated model will be useful and insightful.
The single most important result of this research comes
not from the data analysis, but from the developed method-
ologies. Simulation is a decision support technique that is
relevant to emergency preparedness, especially to an ex-
ercise program the size and complexity of the TOPOFF
program. The organizational learning technique discussed
Lucas, Sanchez, Martinez, Sickinger, and RoginskiFigure 6: Screen shot of emergency first response multi-agent simulation.herein and the incorporation of MAS in emergency first
response simulation can help train first response organiza-
tions more effectively, resulting in better crisis mitigation
and lives saved.
6 SUMMARY
This paper summarizes three diverse applications of MAS
to national security issues. We could have shown dozens
more. Our emphasis is on the types of analyses one can
perform, and the types of insights obtainable, by using
efficient, high-dimensional designs to explore MAS. Due to
space limitations, we have barely touched on the analysis
behind these insights. Interested readers are encouraged
to read the theses of Martinez (2005), Sickinger (2006),
and Roginski (2006) for more details on the simulations,
experimental designs, and analyses.
Simulation experiments are a valuable tool in study-
ing defense and homeland security issues. One need not
look too hard to see similarities between many national
security features and key aspects of MAS. Simple MAS
have already proven useful in generating insights and fo-
cusing high-resolution simulation experiments. For both
of these purposes, the utility of MAS is enhanced by an
infrastructure that allows analysts to quickly build, run, and
analyze many thousands of simulation experiments over a
broad range of input variables. The SEED Center for Data147Farming is researching ways to do this more efficiently and
enable more analysts use these tools and ideas.
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